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Abstract 
 
Spanish newsreels were an extraordinary witness of the worldwide circulation 
of images of the Pacific War. Between 1941 and 1943, they showed the 
Japanese side of the conflict by employing a strategy that had started in the 
Spanish Civil War—appropriating footage from different sources. Thus, 
Japanese news shot by Nihon eiga-sha operators reached Spain as re-edited 
versions of foreign newsreels, mainly from Nazi Germany. Beginning in 1943, 
when NO-DO, the only newsreel allowed in Spain, was founded, the Axis 
armies were in retreat, and Franco Regime needed to shift its position regarding 
its sympathies for the Axis before the increasingly imminent Allied victory. 
Consequently, the representation of the Japanese Empire shifted from one of 
comrade to one of perpetrator, and the entire war was re-interpreted in 
retrospective. Because of agreements with Fox Movietone and Deutsche 
Wochenschau newsreels, NO-DO was able to show both sides of the conflict by 
editing scenes shot by both Japanese and allied operators. This privileged 
access to multiple perspectives on the war allowed Spanish editors to create 
visually astonishing newsreels, which, however, often lacked accuracy 
regarding current affairs. Instead, images were often decontextualised. 
Moreover, Japanese news was adapted and renewed in other propaganda works, 
including those of the enemy. This case study reveals how such “migrating” 
images reveal more about the changing interests of the new Spanish 
Dictatorship than about the events in Asia they were supposed to represent.  
Keywords: Japanese newsreels, Pacific War, Spanish newsreels, Nihon eiga-
sha, NO-DO. 
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The newsreel has gone dithering on, mistaking the phenomenon for the thing in itself,  
and ignoring everything that gave it to the trouble of conscience and penetration and 
thought.  
 
John Grierson, 1937 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, we have witnessed the release of an enormous number of films with 
images that became part of the memory of The Pacific War (1941-1945). In 2006, Clint 
Eastwood directed Flags of Our Fathers, a film that focused on the six marines who raised 
the U.S. flag on Iwo Jima, which was captured in an image taken by Joe Rosenthal in 
1945.i In 2012, Peter Webber made Emperor, which depicted the early days of the Allied 
occupation of Japan and the photograph of MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito taken by 
Gaetano Faillace at the U.S. embassy on September 1945. The number of films and 
documentaries indicate that an interesting marketing operation has been sustained by the 
mysterious attraction to the iconography of World War II in our contemporary society. The 
portrayal of the Pacific War is unprecedented in the history of the newsreel. The Allies and 
Japan mobilised the best operators and directors as well as the most advanced film 
equipment of the time, putting them at the service of their propaganda. Both sides 
developed hidden strategies to depict the war in convincing and persuasive ways. The 
result was the most sophisticated newsreels available to date, which advanced modern war 
reportage and prompted stylistic and technical transformations that would be adapted in 
subsequent news programmes and even fiction films. This text seeks to explore a small part 
of the vast and rich repertoire of images that portray the Pacific War: those projected in 
Spanish newsreels during the years of the conflict, coinciding with the early years of 
Franco’s dictatorship, which had just been installed following the Spanish Civil War 
(1936-1939). The study of the Pacific War through Spanish newsreels is particularly 
interesting because they became a privileged witness of the circulating images across the 
world by combining the Spanish screen footage of both the Allies and the Axis forces. 
Occasionally, these images have been revisited, and some of them have become icons of 
the past. However, their ability to provide insights into the profilmic reality that they are 
supposed to represent must be called into question. I emphasise that the newsreels were 
ideological constructions, thus pointing to the problem of representation, which is the 
object of study for film historians and theorists. While it can be accepted that the messages 
are imposed on newsreels through mechanisms of composition and montage, their 
meanings are not fixed. What the images denote and connote is subject to a never-ending 
process of reinterpretation and adaptation as they are viewed in different contexts. 
Therefore, rather than a nostalgic review of the events portrayed, including the most 
dramatic ones, I propose a study of the discourses that overlap these moving images.   
Mutual expectations of the Spanish and the Japanese  
The relations between the Spanish Republic and the Japanese Empire had been tense since 
the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Unlike Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Portuguese 
Salazar dictatorship, the Japanese government did not assist the military uprising that took 
  
 
place following the victory of the left-wing Popular Front in the Spanish elections of July 
1936. However, during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Nationalist side and Japan 
regarded each other as potential allies. In fact, the Japanese government officially 
recognised the Rebel Government led by General Franco in December 1937 when the 
outcome of the Spanish conflict was yet to be decided. ii  In the Spanish Nationalist 
propaganda, the Japanese and Spanish armies had the same self-assigned roles as “saviours 
of civilization”. iii Many factions within the Franco dictatorship, which was definitively 
installed with the fall of the Republican army in April 1939, enthusiastically received the 
news of Japanese expansionism in Asia.iv Between 1939 and 1940, the government of the 
new Spanish Regime discussed the possibility of improving relations with the Nationalist 
Government of the Kuomintang; however, the dictatorship eventually took the side of 
Japan.v Franco met the Japanese ambassador Suma Yakichiro several times between 1940 
and 1941, expressing his desire to strengthen links between the two countries. The Spanish 
government also recognised the collaborationist government of Wang Jingwei in Nanjing 
and the puppet state of Manchukuo, which had permanent representation in Madrid 
beginning in April 1939. In November, the Spanish ambassador Méndez de Vigo visited 
Manchukuo and was welcomed by its head of State, Emperor Pu-yi. As evidence of the 
support for Japanese actions in Asia, the Spanish version of the Portuguese newsreel, O 
Mikado recebe o imperador do Manchukuo (Mikado Welcomes Manchukuo Emperor), 
covered the event of Emperor Hirohito welcoming Emperor Pu-yi at Tokyo Station in 
January 1940.  
The Spanish reaction to the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 was similar to 
that of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. In January 1942, Ramón Serrano Suñer, leader of 
the fascist party Falange and Foreign Affairs Minister at that point, congratulated Japan for 
its attack on Pearl Harbour. In some aspects, Spain’s willingness to collaborate with Japan 
was even greater than that of the other totalitarian countries, which was indicated by the 
creation of a Spanish–Japanese spy ring in 1938 by Serrano Suñer.vi Among the Spanish 
Falangists and other conservative elements of the Regime, Japanese militarism was 
regarded as the Spanish alter ego in the Far East: they were the “crusaders” who would 
continue in Asia, completing the holy mission of ending the Communist threat that had 
begun during the Spanish Civil War.vii  
In Japan, the press published reports on the rebel side right after the military uprising in 
Spain. After the Civil War, Japan organised a propagandistic campaign to support Franco 
in joining the fight against the British Empire.viii In October, the Asahi Shimbun published 
an article about Franco (November 10, 1940). Its weekly version, Shukan Asahi, also 
published a report on the Spanish dictator, which praised him as a brilliant politician and 
military strategist.ix  
 
                 
The Japanese reported on General Franco after the military uprising in Spain.x  
  
 
Despite the initial expectations, this comradeship became contradictory. First, Spain joined 
the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939. However, the bonds of friendship with Japan were based 
on their common enemy, the Soviet Union, which the Nationalists considered responsible 
for the Spanish Civil War.xi However, after the Nomohan Battle, the Japanese learnt about 
the difficulties of that war, and they did not fight the Soviet Union again from 1939 until 
the last days before their surrender in 1945. The truth was that Japan did not follow 
Germany when Hitler invaded the USSR and in fact, the Japanese–Soviet Non-aggression 
Pact, which was signed in 1941, was evidence of the failure of the Anti-Comintern Pact. 
Second, although the invasion of Gibraltar was key in the discussions with the Third Reich, 
Franco never declared war against the British Empire, and the Spanish expansionist 
aspirations stopped with the occupation of Tangier, Morocco in 1940.  
Appropriation of images 
Despite the contradictions, the news screened in Spain at the beginning of the Pacific War 
was unmistakably aligned with the Japanese stance. Spanish newsreels made beginning in 
1941 are interesting objects of study because editors developed a singular process for re-
editing material from diverse sources, a phenomenon that had started in the Spanish Civil 
War. This conflict received unprecedented visual coverage. However, when the military 
uprising took place in Africa, most of the Spanish film equipment, professionals, and 
studios were on the Republican side mainly in Madrid and Barcelona.xii Consequently, the 
rebels articulated the effective propaganda strategy of appropriating footage from the other 
side of the front. That meant attacking the Republic with Republican images. To that end, 
Falange created the Service for Recovery Documents (Servicio de Recuperación de 
Documentos), which was responsible for confiscating material from the enemy in order to 
use it as a powerful counter-propaganda tool. Thus, the rebel forces launched El Noticiario 
Español (The Spanish Newsreel) in April 1938, which disseminated unprecedented 
“shock” propaganda with the support of the Third Reich. It was edited by Geyer 
laboratories in Berlin and distributed by TOBIS Filmkunst, and it was screened until 
March 1941. xiii  One of the most remarkable examples of the strategy of footage re-
appropriation is Reportaje del movimiento revolucionario en Barcelona (Reportage on the 
Revolutionary Movement in Barcelona), which portrays the inception of a social revolution 
in Barcelona by Mateo Santos and anarchist cameramen for the C.N.T.–F.A.I. union on 
July 19–23, 1936. The film’s anticlerical and anti-capitalist tone was widely used in 
Nationalist propaganda to justify the military uprising. xiv  Vicente Sánchez-Biosca 
eloquently explained how the meanings of images changed as they circulated from the 
Republican to the Nationalist side and from Spain to other countries.xv 
Between 1938 and 1943, several foreign newsreels were screened on the Nationalist side 
and the subsequent Franco Regime, such as the Spanish version of the German Deutsche 
Wochenschau and UFA-Wochenschau, the Italian LUCE, and those produced by the 
American and German branches of Fox Movietone. xvi  The case of Fox Movietone 
newsreels is especially remarkable, as they had been distributed in Spain since the silent 
film era. At the beginning of the Civil War, they were edited on the Republican side. 
However, the company reached an agreement with Franco’s government to screen an 
edition of its German version, Fox Tönende Wochenschau from January 1939, in addition 
to their own reports. However, after the unification of newsreels by Goebbels in June 1940 
under Deutsche Wochenschau newsreels, Fox reduced its activities, and R. Tranche argued 
that the version screened in Spain probably was the American edition from that point.xvii   
  
 
While all production companies were obliged to put their footage at the State’s disposal 
beginning on July 1, 1938, and all newsreels were censored or adapted when required, it is 
significant that Francoist screens contained images from multiple sources: the Republican 
Side (until the end of the Spanish Civil War), Axis countries, and even the Allies. The 
complex phenomenon of the appropriation of images subsequently became predominant 
during World War II. In fact, one of the first moving images shown in Spain about the 
Japanese Empire was Japón en Guerra (Japan at War), which was probably a version of 
the French newsreel Japon En Guerre. Reportages sur les hostilites entre le Japon et les 
puissances anglo-saxonne, which was edited for the Éclair Journal newsreel between 1941 
and 1942.xviii However, most news of the Pacific War during this period reached Spain 
through Noticiario UFA, which by then was a version of the only German newsreel, 
Deutsche Wochenschau.   
The most significant production of this period was probably Un Año de Guerra en la Gran 
Asia Oriental (One Year of War in the Great East Asia, a version of Ein Jahr Krieg in 
Gross-Ostasien (1942), a nineteen-minute report made one year after the attack on Pearl 
Harbour to explain that the Japanese Empire had been unavoidably prompted to lead a war 
against the Western powers. Most of the reportage consists of a map of the Pacific with a 
voice-over giving a historical review of the previous 100 years, during which Japan is 
portrayed as constantly under siege and threatened by Britain and America. The British 
colonies in China and the American possessions of Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Guam, and the 
Philippines are explained as hostile acts that formed parts of the systematic march on Japan. 
It is interesting to note that during these early years, the enthusiastic support for Japanese 
actions left Spanish imperialistic aspirations in the region in second place, and no 
references to the old Spanish colonial rule on Guam and the Philippines were added. The 
narrator explains that the “Singapore and Hong Kong fortress constituted the most solid 
siege against Japan” and illustrates it by two threatening arrows surrounding the Japanese 
archipelago. The voice-over then concludes, “The 8th December of 1941, Japan started to 
demolish England and U.S.’s bastions in the Pacific”. Hence, the Pacific War is portrayed 
as a defensive act that resulted from the historical aggression by the American and British 
powers. The last part of the reportage presents footage of the Burma Campaign, which 
began in January 1942. These images are used to show the Japanese as “liberators” of Asia 
from the Western powers.  
   
Figure 1. Spanish newsreel, Un Año de Guerra en la Gran Asia Oriental (One Year of War in the Great 
East Asia, 1942. The images are from a Nihon Nyūsu newsreel but edited through a Deutsche 
Wochenschau newsreel. 
This newsreel justifies the conquest of the Pacific as an act of defence first and an act of 
liberation later; however, only these ideas are clear, as this piece offers very little 
information on current affairs. Pearl Harbour is not mentioned, and the subsequent images 
of Japanese soldiers marching on Burma are not contextualised. The voice-over announces, 
“with the bombing on Midway islands, one of the most important U.S. attacking positions 
against Japan was reached”. It then continues, “Japan armed forces enter the city. Burmese 
  
 
people greet their liberators”. Through this misleading geographical jump, the narration 
seems to say that the Japanese forces entered an unidentified city in the Midway Islands 
rather than Burma. Finally, the reportage concludes, “at the starting point of the Burmese 
road, more than one million tonnes of war material destined for Chongqing armies were 
found. The game is lost Mr. Churchill!” This closing sentence demonstrates blatant 
indifference to whether the newsreel has an informative function, which contrasts the 
interest in creating messages that could be re-read and interpreted in local terms. Thus, the 
reference to Churchill and the occupation of Burma fuelled Spanish aspirations to take 
Gibraltar.  
There is another significant omission in this piece. Although the images show Japanese 
soldiers taking the Burma Road, the importance of this route, which was China’s main 
source of supplies from the Western forces, is not explained. Similarly, two other 
newsreels about the Japanese Empire, which were sourced from German newsreels, were 
shown in Spain: Flota Imperial Japonesa (Imperial Japanese Fleet, from the German 
newsreel Die Kaiserlich Japanische Kriegsflotte) and Paracaidistas Japoneses (Japanese 
Parachutists),xix in which information is again replaced by a display of the power of the 
Japanese army by showing spectacular scenes of the imperial navy and parachutists taking 
over an oil refinery in Palembang, Indonesia. In both cases, the facts are decontextualized, 
and the spectator can barely tell to where and when these events belong. Japanese 
Parachutists closely portrays a group of soldiers climbing over a wall but fails to explain 
that Palembang had a strategic airfield, and its fuel supply was key for the Japanese army 
after the oil embargo by the U.S., British, and Dutch. 
These newsreels were unable to accomplish any instructive role. However, they became an 
efficient ideological transmitter of Spanish falangism. They privileged propaganda over 
any form of informative neutrality, and they articulated a modern strategy aimed at 
stimulating a thrilling response to the “glorious victories” of the Axis through montage as 
well as visual and sound composition. Through the dramatic force of their visual content 
and the emotional shock they provoked, these images lost their concreteness and embodied 
only general ideas. Rather than a referential function, the strength of these images relies on 
their transcendental function: they became icons of the new order brought by the 
totalitarian powers. This process explains how the facts in South East Asia became 
meaningful in the remote Spanish context. The “liberations” of Burma and Palembang 
were easily linked to the fantasies of the Spanish fascist party to occupy Gibraltar. In 
addition, beyond the ephemeral events displayed on the screen, the images were used to 
illustrate long-lasting messages aimed at justifying Axis actions abroad and, more 
importantly, legitimising the new Spanish dictatorship, as they allowed Japanese actions to 
be seen as a continuation of the violent fascist revolution that had started in Spain in 1936.  
Original sources: the Japanese news industry 
It is important to note that while the images of the Pacific War were versions of either 
German, Portuguese, or French newsreels, they were from the same origin: the weekly 
Japanese newsreel Nihon News (Nihon Nyūsu).xx Nihon News was produced by the Nihon 
News Film Company (Nihon Nyūsu eiga-sha, later known as Nihon eiga-sha or Nichiei), 
which monopolised the production of newsreels in Japan beginning in 1940. The Film Law 
(Eiga Hō), which was enacted in 1939 after the negotiations between the heads of the four 
news companies, representatives from the Foreign, Home, and Education Ministries, the 
army, and the navy, established that the production of newsreels should be centralised. 
  
 
Nihon eiga-sha was founded on April 15, 1940 and financed by the Council of Information 
Cabinet (Naikaku johobu). xxi  Inosuke Furuno was named head of the new newsreel 
company, and the first edition of Nihon Nyūsu was issued on June 11, 1940.  
However, during the 1930s, a prolific newsreel industry had flourished in Japan. The first 
periodical newsreels were produced by the main national newspaper companies in 1934. 
These included the Asashi Sekai Nyūsu (Asahi World News), which was followed by 
Mainichi newspaper’s Daimai Tōnichi Nyūsu (Mainichi Osaka-Tokyo Daily News) and 
Yomiuri Nyūsu (Yomiuri News). In addition, the Tōhō Sound News (Hassei) started 
operations in February 1934, and the Dōmei News Agency launched its own newsreel 
Dōmei Nyūsu (Dōmei News) in 1936.xxii Nevertheless, it was the outbreak of the war in 
China in 1937 that marked the rise of this industry and ushered in the “Golden Age of 
newsreels” in Japan. xxiii After the China Incident, the number of newsreel theatres in Japan 
rose from three before the China Incident to 101 by the end of 1937. xxiv Between 1937 and 
1939, production and distribution were propelled by the competition among the four 
companies. In addition, the popularity of the newsreels was based on the growing interest 
among the Japanese audience in receiving news from China, as an increasing number of 
families had relatives enlisted at the front.xxv Consequently, newsreel production doubled. 
Before the war, the Asahi, Mainichi and Yomiuri companies produced about 195 newsreel 
prints per week. After the beginning of the conflict, these three newspaper companies, 
along with Dōmei, produced over 510 prints a week.xxvi  
 
 
  
Figure 2. Asahi Sekai Nyūsu (Asashi World News, no. 206), screened in Japan on  December 23, 
1937 
The vast number of images shot during the Pacific War by Japanese operators was widely 
circulated across the world and became part of other editions overseas, such as in German 
or Spanish newsreels. Furthermore, these images never stopped circulating. They also fell 
into enemy hands and even ended up being part of the Allied propaganda.xxvii One of the 
most remarkable examples is the Why We Fight series, which consists of documentary 
films commissioned by the U.S. War Department to convince the American public of the 
need to become involved in the war. Frank Capra and Anatole Litvak, directors of the sixth 
episode, The Battle of China (1944), used footage from Japanese newsreels to accompany 
the voice-over, which explains that the Nanking Massacre was perpetrated by the Japanese 
army in 1937. After the fall of Shanghai, the General Headquarters in Tokyo ordered the 
capture of Nanking, the then-capital of the Chinese Republic on the December 1, 1937. 
Two weeks later, teams from all the news production companies of the time—Asashi, 
Mainichi, Yomiuri, and Domei—in addition to a team from the Tōhō Culture Film Unit 
(Tōhō Bunka Eiga), the main producer of documentaries during the war, were ready to film 
the fall of the city.xxviii Capra and Litvak used footage shot by cameramen embedded with 
the Imperial forces, who captured scenes of soldiers climbing the walls of the city, 
marching across its ruins, inspecting Chinese citizens, and issuing them identification 
papers as “proof of living peacefully”. The Battle of China also includes footage of the 
Japanese army led by General Mitsue Iwane entering the city on December 17, 1937, an 
  
 
event that was orchestrated for Japanese photographers and cameramen.xxix The Why We 
Fight episode also includes scenes of executions that are not included in the newsreels 
consulted for the present research. These scenes were not included either in Tōhō 
documentary, Nanking (Akimoto Takeshi, 1938).xxx Scholars have noted that taping of the 
massacres was completely forbidden. xxxi  For example, Tōhō cinematographer Shirai 
Shigeru stated in his memoirs that he witnessed long lines of Chinese being sent to the 
banks of Yangtze River to be executed, which he was not allowed to film. xxxii The original 
footage of these scenes of executions has not yet been located.  
Tracing the origins of The Battle of China would have been extremely difficult because of 
the complexity of different sources, materials, and footage. Nevertheless, Capra and Litvak 
made an extraordinarily powerful film, in terms of both the narrative and the visual 
imagery. They provided multiple points of view and showed the front lines from different 
perspectives through scenes captured by journalists positioned on both sides of the conflict. 
However, despite the unprecedented visual effects, Capra did not undermine the 
informative function of the documentary. On the contrary, unlike the decontextualised and 
ahistorical representations of events in the Spanish newsreels, these directors followed a 
different direction and based the U.S. propaganda strategy on the conviction that the 
American audience could be persuaded through the detailed explanation of events.xxxiii  
Migration of images 
At this point, it is important to note a paradoxical fact: although the images of the Japanese 
army entering Burma and Nanking were initially used to represent the Japanese army as 
“liberators”, they were subsequently used to represent it as the aggressor in the war. The 
images in effect were self-accusatory and therefore “signed” by the perpetrators. If the 
same images could be used to illustrate opposite meanings, what kind of historical 
approach did they allow Antony Aldgate in providing some of the earliest attempts to 
defend the value of the newsreels made during the Pacific War as a source of history? 
Aldgate used films of the Spanish Civil War to illustrate the power of these images as a 
medium for mass communication, but he also warned about their potentially misleading 
nature as the consequence of editors’ manipulations. In fact, Aldgate  showedseveral 
examples that led him to conclude that newsreels helped to prevent the Spanish conflict 
from being understood.xxxiv   
These facts force us to redefine contemporary approaches to wartime propaganda images. 
The scholarship in the sociology of cinema has often drawn on newsreels made since the 
Spanish Civil War to study how images can be blatant manipulations rather than 
documents of factual truths. Pierre Sorlin warned about the uselessness of using cinema to 
understand the profilmic reality, as every film could be considered an ideological 
expression of the time.xxxv However, far from considering ideological constructions an 
obstacle to obtaining insights into the past, Sorlin pointed out that they could become 
enriching objects of analysis. Unlike the Soviet formalist theories of montage, ulterior 
meanings, or the “generalized idea” in Eisenstein’s terms, do not depend on editing and 
composition techniques but on the context in which they are used. In effect, Sorlin called 
into question the ability traditionally assigned to filmmakers and editors to convey 
meanings. The power of newsreels goes beyond the intentions of directors, operators, and 
editors, as ultimately, the meanings of images and messages are not set in stone. News is 
subject to an everlasting process of creating meanings because filmed objects themselves 
do not project political and ideological messages.   
  
 
The polysemic nature of visual content is incomprehensible without considering the 
incessant phenomenon recently tackled in the Archaeology of Images: the notion of 
“migration of images” coined by Vicente Sánchez-Biosca. This scholar demonstrated that 
the construction of meaning is an indefatigable process that takes place as images are 
transferred across different geographies and historical contexts. This migration is possible 
because in the media’s construction of events, images do not reproduce facts but only 
represent them; therefore, they show only one version of reality. Thus, it is impossible to 
liberate images from synchronic needs and interests of any kind.xxxvi   
Delocalised events in the official newsreel NO-DO (1943–1945) 
In the light of the discussion so far, any hermeneutic approach to the representations of the 
war must consider the understanding that images are detached from the referent they are 
supposed to portray. The shifting narratives articulated by the voice-overs in Spanish 
newsreels of the Pacific War between 1943 and 1945 exemplify the malleability of visual 
content. By February 1943, the Axis armies were in clear retreat after the defeat of the 
Eighth Germany Army in Stalingrad and the U.S. landing at Guadalcanal. Franco had no 
choice but to change his foreign policy to be in a better position before the increasingly 
probable Allied victory. The Spanish government officially declared its “neutrality” in 
October 1943, and, with caution, Franco initiated the apparent “defascistisation” of the 
Regime.xxxvii  
The fascist party Falange had gradually lost the power of its propaganda in the press. The 
new person in charge of the National Department of Film (Departamento Nacional de 
Cinematografía), Gabriel Arias Salgado, implemented a pragmatic propaganda strategy, 
sensing the change and shaping the representation of the war according to the 
developments of the current affairs in the world.xxxviii On  December 22, 1942, a decree 
established the creation of a new newsreel, NO-DO (Noticiarios y Documentales), which 
began after the dismissal of Serrano Suñer as the foreign affairs minister and the fall of the 
radical Falangist faction in August. From January 1, 1943, all other newsreels and 
documentaries were banned and NO-DO became the only newsreel in Spain during the 
following four decades.xxxix  
However, unlike the Japanese and German proactive propaganda, which was aimed at 
mobilising the population during the war, NO-DO sought to demobilise its audience, 
especially while the Axis defeats proliferated. Consequently, the Spanish government 
initiated the contradictory strategy of approaching the Allies with calculated ambiguity. 
NO-DO articulated a singular portrayal of World War II, which fitted Franco’s idea of the 
three wars: first, the Eastern front between Germany and the Soviet Union, in which Spain 
was pro-Axis; second, the European theatre between the Axis and the Allies in which 
Spain was neutral; third, the Pacific War in which, surprisingly, Spain was now for the 
Allied forces.  
NO-DO did not have the means to produce its own news about the rest of the world, but it 
secured agreements to use Deutsche Wochenschau and Fox Movietone newsreels. Hence, 
in narrating the events of the Pacific War, NO-DO counted on footage that was shot on the 
one hand by German and Japanese operators of Nihon eiga-sha through Deutsche 
Wochenschau and, on the other hand, footage that was filmed by American and British 
operators from Fox Movietone. The footage obtained from the Allied crews was 
increasingly prominent as the war proceeded. The addition of material produced by the U.S. 
had not only political implications but also a powerful visual effect because it allowed 
  
 
Spanish spectators to witness significant events from both sides of the conflict. News no. 
114B and no. 138A show scenes taken from inside American airplanes that were ready for 
combat and already fighting. The in-air fighting is also portrayed in no. 137B, which shows 
Japanese air attacks and kamikaze airplanes filmed with handheld cameras. These 
privileged views of the conflict and the access to multiple angles allowed the creation of 
visually astonishing newsreels. However, NO-DO did not take advantage of the 
opportunity to offer more accurate information on the war. On the contrary, NO-DO was 
often misleading, presenting decontextualised images, such as Guerra en el Mar (War at 
Sea), no. 33A, which is comprised of scenes on a battleship. The narration focuses on the 
ship’s armaments and powerful weapons. However, while it may appear that this footage is 
American, it does not mention where the battleship is or against whom it is fighting. 
Furthermore, this piece seems to anticipate the turn in the war. The subsequent newsreels 
portray the gradual Allied advance. The Japanese retreat in the Philippines is featured in no. 
114B, which includes the battle in Luzon Island. No. 117B presents point-of-view shots 
taken from American B-29 bombers as well as the liberation of Manila by General 
MacArthur. Nos. 124A and 124B show the ruins of the city after the fight. No. 120A 
depicts the air raids over Taiwan and the occupation of Iwo Jima. Finally, the march over 
Okinawa is shown in no. 139A and no. 140A.  
NO-DO continued to use footage from Nihon Nyūsu in its editions, but they gradually take 
a linguistic turn, and the tone used to describe Japanese victories becomes less and less 
frantic. The news Desembarco Japones En Islas Aleutianas (Japanese Landing on Aleutian 
Islands), a version of the Deutsche Wochenschau newsreel, was originally comprised of 
scenes filmed for Nihon Nyūsu no. 174. It was entitled Yamazaki butai gōdō ireisai 
(Yamazaki Military Units Memorial Service), which featured Colonel Yamasaki Yasuyo, 
the commander in charge of holding the Japanese position in the Aleutian Islands, 
conducting a military ceremony in a valley on the island of Attu in March 1937. The next 
newsreel on Japan, Desfile Hirohito (Hirohito’s March-past), no. 46B, was institutional and 
definitively signalled the end of the enthusiasm about Japanese expansionism. This 
newsreel probably belonged to Nihon Nyūsu no. 136, which was titled Daigensui heika 
shinrin rikugun hajime kanpei-shiki (His Majesty’s New Year Military Review) and filmed 
at Yoyogi Park, Tokyo, on January 8, 1943. Hirohito’s March Past fitted better with the  
traditionalist and monarchist views of the Spanish Regime, and it shifted away from the 
most controversial aspects of the war. Thus, this newsreel, in which Catholic traditionalism 
supplants fascist falangism, marks a change in the depiction of the Pacific War.  
In 1944, the Japanese army experiences one defeat after another; however, none are 
explicitly portrayed by NO-DO. The newsreel Asalto a Saipán (Assault on Saipan) presents 
the Battle of Saipan. This fight between the American and Japanese forces was portrayed 
in Nihon Nyūsu no. 216, Kokudo senjō saipan tō shubi-tai gyokusai (Honorable Death in 
the Battlefield Defending Saipan) and screened in Japan in July 1944. However, the 
Spanish newsreel seems to have been edited to include scenes filmed by the Allies. Unlike 
previous maps displayed in German, this newsreel uses maps in English, and the remaining 
scenes show the American assault on the island without reference to the enemy. NO-DO 
continued using German newsreels to provide news about Japan but selected only the least 
newsworthy, such as the training of candidates for the Japanese marines in no. 60; news 
recalling tourist reports, such as in no. 99B; portraying the Japanese parliament; Himeji 
Castle; sport competitions and children practising gymnastics; and citizens looking at an 
eclipse through telescopes in no. 103B. Throughout 1943, NO-DO did not inform 
  
 
audiences about the German defeats and focused instead on Nazi machinery, technology, 
and organisation (nos. 20 and 35), their supposed sources of supremacy.  
Inverting senses: From allies to enemies 
During the last months of the war in 1945, the sources used to compile NO-DO newsreels 
about the Pacific War changed dramatically, and the German and Japanese footage was 
completely replaced by American and British news. Ironically, the earliest representation 
of the events in Asia presented citizens celebrating the Japanese “liberation” of Burma, 
whereas in one of the last newsreels, the piece Campaña de Birmania (Burmese Campaign, 
NO-DO no.138) showed the same population welcoming the new liberators. The montage 
draws on British news to depict General Louis Mountbatten’s forces taking Rangoon 
(Yangon) while the remaining Japanese detachments are captured, and the Burmese 
population now acclaims the former British “Western oppressors” as rescuers. The same 
newsreel NO-DO no. 138 adds Allied content that features the American advance on 
Okinawa in the piece Últimos episodios bélicos. La batalla de Okinawa (Last War 
Episodes: The Battle of Okinawa). Nihon eiga-sha also filmed combat between the 
Japanese and U.S. armies in Okinawa. Okinawa Kessen (Okinawa Decisive Battle, Nihon 
News no. 250) was screened in Japan in May 1945. However, these scenes were likely not 
available in Spain because of the capitulation of Nazi Germany in the same month. The 
lack of images of the Axis is evident in Últimos reportajes de guerra (Last War Reports, 
NO-DO no. 141B), which is comprised exclusively of American news. This report includes 
no Japanese footage that illustrates the events in the Pacific and no German footage that 
shows the end of the war in Europe.  
 
 
Figure 3. Campaña de Birmania (Burmese Campaign, NO-DO, no.138, 1945). 
The last newsreel about the Pacific War shown in Spain was Victoria sobre Japón (Victory 
over Japan, NO-DO no.142A), which announces the Japanese defeat and uses the 
opportunity to present a historical review of the Pacific War, attempting to change the 
Spanish regime’s interpretation of the conflict. Thus, Victory over Japan offers a chronicle 
of all stages of the war through which the representation of the Japanese Empire shifts 
from honourable Asian comrades to bloodthirsty perpetrators of numerous war crimes. It 
starts with the occupation of Manchuria where the voice-over states, “Japan, the first of the 
aggressive nations of this war leapt fourteen years ago into an international campaign of 
conquest and plundering”. Then scenes of the Japanese air raid on Shanghai accompany 
the narrator, who asserts, “China, bleeding and plundered continued to be the scene of 
devastation and death. Millions of its inhabitants were helpless”. This piece continues with 
an account of Pearl Harbour, which had never before been included in Spanish newsreels. 
Four years later, the attack is heavily criticised: the “Japanese delegation in the U.S. 
pretended to be missionaries of friendship and peace. While negotiations continued, their 
compatriots delivered an unseen savage and infamous blow”. This footage is followed by 
scenes featuring the most shocking elements at the end of the war, the kamikaze attacks, 
which are described as being carried out by “suicidal fanatics”.  
  
 
 
   
Figure 4. Portraying the attack on Pearl Harbour in Victoria sobre Japón (Victory over Japan, 
NODO no. 142A, 1945)  
This example shows the efforts of the Spanish dictatorship to seek rupture from the Axis, 
but this strategy was contradictory for two reasons. First, the Spanish dictatorship did not 
actually break diplomatic relations with Japan until the very end of the war when it used as 
a pretext the Manila Massacre, in which several Spanish citizens died at the hands of the 
retreating Japanese army. Franco opportunistically declared war on Japan on April 14, 
1945. Second, Franco never withdrew his support for Hitler. In fact, while the Japanese 
defeat is openly depicted in Victory over Japan, the entrance of the Red Army into Berlin 
was never shown in Spain.xl Thus, unlike the discursive efforts to dissimulate the fall of 
Nazi Germany, the Japanese surrender was not only presented in the Victory Over Japan 
but also was highlighted in other two pieces: Así se rindió Japan (Japan Surrounded Like 
This, no. 41) and the reportage A lomos de las olas (On the Back of Waves). The latter 
features the iconic images of MacArthur landing at Atsugi airfield and the signing of the 
unconditional surrender on the Missouri battleship. In addition, America’s use of atomic 
bombs was shown in two newsreels without any indication of criticism. NO-DO no. 143B, 
which was screened twenty days before the attack on Hiroshima, includes details about the 
experiments conducted to create the atomic bomb, which is described as a technical, 
scientific, and military achievement. Similarly, no. 144A, Japón bajo las bombas (Japan 
Under the Bombs), depicts the devastation caused by the atomic bombs, which are 
ultimately described as extraordinarily useful inventions with potential applications for 
peacetime.  
Conclusion  
 
The ambiguous position of the Franco regime in World War II transformed Spanish 
newsreels into privileged witnesses of the images of the Pacific War, which were 
circulated worldwide. Francoist editors, who had been well trained in the strategy of re-
appropriating footage from the enemy to create their own propaganda material, expanded 
this cinematic technique in the wide context of World War II. They re-used American and 
British newsreels on one hand and Japanese newsreels on the other hand, both of which 
reached Spain in a large range of formats. The footage shot by operators working for Nihon 
eiga-sha included a wide variety of visual content that included not only Axis propaganda 
in Nazi Germany but also American documentaries. Hence, this case study presented an 
extraordinary opportunity to obtain deeper insights into the range of images and their 
unsteady nature. In addition, this exploration of their transnational usage provides 
methodological contributions that are crucial to the better understanding of wartime 
propaganda strategies and are key in overcoming traditional approaches limited to a 
national perspective.  
  
 
Although Spain did not have the resources necessary to cover the conflict on its own, 
Spanish newsreels used the most advanced film techniques and projected a rich variety of 
perspectives sometimes from both sides of the same battle, which was a singular cinematic 
phenomenon. However, this phenomenon is misleading because, contrary to potential 
assumptions, none of these “migrating images” faithfully reproduced the narrative of either 
side of the conflict, and they did not help to provide an accurate account of the war. Images 
migrated across the world, and their meanings mutated. They were adapted, renewed, and 
eventually perverted. The careful analysis of this process presented here helps to explain 
the reason that the delocalised use of images of the Pacific War reveals more about the 
changing interests of the new Spanish dictatorship than about the events in Asia, which 
they are supposed to represent. For instance, the portrayal of the Japanese occupation of 
the British colony of Burma was shown in Spain in 1942 not to explain the importance of 
this military tactic in continental Asia but to fuel the aspirations of Spanish nationalists 
when the talks with Nazi Germany regarding Gibraltar were to be concluded. However, as 
the war turned in favour of the Allies, the new official newsreel NO-DO incorporated 
decontextualised Japanese footage as temporary transition before the last depiction of the 
Japanese army as responsible for the conflict, which was supported by the increasing use of 
footage shot by American and British operators. Thus, Spanish newsreels became a 
palimpsest of narratives, which could be of interest to archaeologists of images, whose 
tasks should be not only to determine the origins of the footage but also to assess the 
messages, ideological connotations, and symbolic meanings that have accumulated 
throughout their incessant displacement.  
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